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Abstract
We quantized the Hawk-Dove game by using the most general form of
a pure initial state to investigate the existence of pure and mixed Evo-
lutionarily Stable Strategies (ESS). An example is considered to draw
a comparison between classical and quantum version of the game. Our
choice of most general initial quantum state enables us to make the game
symmetric or asymmetric. We show that for a particular set of game pa-
rameters where there exist only mixed ESS in the classical version of the
game, however, quantization allows even a pure strategy to be an ESS for
symmetric game in addition to ixed ESS. On the other hand only pure
strategy ESS can exist for asymmetric quantum version of the Hawk-Dove
game.
1 Introduction
The concept of evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS) was originally introduced
in evolutionary biology [1]. Later it has been incorporated as a central concept
of stable equilibrium in evolutionarily game theory. Consider a population in
which majority is playing a particular strategy and a very small fraction of this
population, called mutants, start playing a different strategy. If the mutant
strategy remains at disadvantage against the majority strategy then as a conse-
quence mutants strategy gradually disappears. In such a situation the majority
strategy is called an ESS. The mathematical theory of ESS was developed for
game theoretical analysis of animal conflicts where they are undergoing natural
selection. Interestingly the dynamics of evolution resulting from Darwinian idea
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of survival of fittest implies that ESS must remain stable against small perturba-
tions caused by mutants. Game theory itself derived much from such analysis of
evolutionary mechanism. Our motivation in present paper is to give a thought
to evolution, as concretely described in notion of ESS, in circumstances when
the game played in population becomes quantum in its setting.
In an interesting development Meyer [2] examined the game theory from
quantum mechanical perspective showing that a player having an access to
quantum strategies can enhance his/her payoff with respect to an opponent
who have access to classical strategies only. Later, Eisert et. al. [3] analyzed
a famous game of Prisoner Dilemma in its quantum mechanical version and
showed that the dilemma no more exists in quantum version of this game. They
also successfully constructed a quantum strategy which always wins over any
classical strategy. Marinatto and Weber [8] proposed another interesting quan-
tization scheme for games where players can implement their ‘tactics’ on an
initial strategy by probabilistic choice of applying the identity operator I and
the flip operator C. They applied their scheme to a famous game of Battle
of Sexes and showed that both the players can get better payoff in a quantum
version of this game.
A consideration of ESS in quantum games is presented by Iqbal and Toor
[10, 11]. They analyzed the quantum games of Prisoner’s Dilemma and Battle
of Sexes from the point of view of evolutionary stability. Underlying assumption
in their approach is that a population is playing a quantum game in two player
conflict scenario. They showed that evolutionary stability of Nash equilibria in
symmetric as well as asymmetric games can be controlled by changing initial
quantum state. Recently Prisoner Dilemma has also been investigated for ESS
that is played by using Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen type of setting [12].
In this paper we study an interesting game from evolutionary biology called
Hawk-Dove game. In this game Hawk and Dove are the strategies available to
the players to get some valuable resource. The most interesting feature of this
game in its classical form, which is symmetric, is that neither Hawk nor Dove
strategy can be a pure ESS, however, there can exist a mixed ESS. We have
used a most general initial quantum state in quantization that enables us to
make the game symmetric or asymmetric. Our main result in this paper is that
quantization of the game allows even a pure strategy to be an ESS for symmetric
game in addition to mixed ESS. On the other hand only pure strategy ESS can
exist for asymmetric quantum version of the Hawk-Dove game.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in Sect. 2 ESS are discussed
from mathematical point of view. Section 3 deals with classical Hawk-Dove
game while in Sect. 4 we present our main result.
2 Evolutionarily Stable Strategies
Consider a large population in which members are randomly paired to contest
against each other in a game. In this pair wise contest the average payoff for
a group of members playing strategy A against a small fraction, ǫ, of the total
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population playing strategy B is $[A, (1− ǫ)A+ ǫB]. Mathematically a strategy
A will be an ESS against a strategy B, if
$[A, (1− ǫ)A+ ǫB] > $[B, (1− ǫ)A+ ǫB], (1)
there exists a sufficiently small but positive ǫ ∈ [0, ǫ0] [4]. Here ǫ0 is called the
invasion barrier. The strategy played by the smaller group is generally called
mutant strategy and in our case if the fraction of members playing strategy
B becomes larger than ǫ0, then the corresponding mutant strategy B would
be able to invade and strategy A would no longer be an ESS. In the case of
symmetric bi-matrix game between the pairs of members, the above condition
for ESS becomes [4, 5]:
$(A,A) > $(B,A)
and if $(A,A) = $(B,A) then $(A,B) > $(B,B). For asymmetric case Nash
equilibrium with strict inequality must hold to ensure that strategy A is an ESS
[6]. For example, a strategy pair (A∗, B∗) is an ESS if $(A∗, B∗) > $(A,B∗) for
all A∗ 6= A and $B(A∗, B∗) > $B(A∗, B) for all B 6= B∗.
3 Classical Hawk-Dove Game
Hawk-Dove is a simple two player game where two different behavioral strate-
gies are available to the players to obtain some resources [7]. Hawks are very
aggressive and always fight to take possession of resource. These fights are very
brutal and loser is the one who first sustains the injury. The winner takes the
sole possession of the resource. Mathematical description of the game requires
that the Hawks fully recover before the next contest. In case both the players
opt for Hawk, then the winning probability for both is equal.
On the other hand Doves never fights for a resource. It displays and if at-
tacked it immediately withdraws to avoid injury. Thus it will always lose a
conflict against Hawk without sustaining any injury. In other words Doves fit-
ness remains unaffected. In case two Doves face each other, there will be period
of displaying with some cost (time, energy for display) to both but without any
injury. It is assumed that both the Doves are equally good in displaying and
waiting for random time. In the Dove-Dove contest, both have equal chance of
winning. The winner would be the one with more patience [7].
Let υ and i are the value of resource and cost of injury, respectively. Cost
of losing a resource is 0, while the cost of displaying is d. For mathematical
description of the game we assume that υ is a positive number and both i and
d are negative numbers. The payoff matrix for the game takes the form:
Hawk (H) Dove (D)
Hawk (H)
Dove (D)
[
(υ
2
+ i
2
, υ
2
+ i
2
) (υ, 0)
(0, υ) (υ
2
+ d, υ
2
+ d)
]
(2)
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It is straight forward to conclude from the above payoff matrix that strategy
Hawk is an ESS if either
$(H,H) > $(D,H) (3)
or
$(H,H) = $(D,H) and $(H,D) > $(D,D) (4)
For the above payoff matrix (2), the first condition translates to (υ + i) > 0
and the second to υ + i = 0 and υ
2
> d. Since υ
2
> d always holds, therefore,
Hawk is an ESS whenever υ + i ≥ 0. Moreover, it important to note that
$(H,D) > $(D,D), hence strategy Dove can never be an ESS [7]. To illustrate
our point, lets consider the following example where (υ + i) < 0 [7];
Value of resource υ = 50
Injury to self i = −100
Cost of display d = −10
Resource cost c = 0 (5)
and the payoff matrix (2) takes the form
H D
H
D
[
(−25,−25) (50, 0)
(0, 50) (15, 15)
]
(6)
It is clear that there is no ESS for any pure strategy in this game [7]. Next we
look at the possibility of ESS in mixed strategies.
Again consider a large population where strategy H is being played by a
fraction h of the total population and remaining population is playing strategy
D. In a pair wise contest the corresponding fitnesses functions W (H), W (D)
are defined as [7]
W (H) = $(H,H)h+ $(H,D)(1 − h),
W (D) = $(D,H)h+ $(D,D)(1− h). (7a)
For a mixed strategy to be an ESS, for both the strategies we must have equal
fitness functions, which implies
h =
2d− υ
2d+ i
. (8)
Lets explore the possibility of mixed strategy ESS for the set of values considered
in the above example [see Eq. (5)]. Putting these values in the Eq. (8), we see
that there exist an ESS for h = .583.
4
4 Quantum Hawk-Dove Game
We follow the Marinatto and Weber’s scheme to quantize the strategy space for
Hawk and Dove game [8]. Assuming that two players, Alice and Bob, share the
following entangled state:
|ψin〉 = a |HH〉+ b |DD〉+ c |HD〉+ d |DH〉 (9)
where |a|2+ |b|2+ |c|2+ |d|2 = 1 and the first slot is reserved for Alice’s strategy
and the second for Bob’s. Let C be a unitary and Hermitian operator (i.e.,
C = C† = C−1), such that
C |H〉 = |D〉 , C |D〉 = |H〉 . (10)
If Alice uses I, the identity operator, with probability p and C with probability
(1−p) and Bob uses these operators with probability q and (1−q), respectively.
Then the final density matrix of the bipartite system takes the form [?];
ρf = pq
[
(IA ⊗ IB) ρin
(
I
†
A ⊗ I†B
)]
+p(1− q)
[
(IA ⊗ CB) ρin
(
I
†
A ⊗ C†B
)]
+q(1− p)
[
(CA ⊗ IB) ρin
(
C
†
A ⊗ I†B
)]
+(1− p)(1− q)
[
(CA ⊗ CB) ρin
(
C
†
A ⊗ C†B
)]
. (11)
Here ρin = |ψin〉 〈ψin| . The payoff operators for Alice and Bob are defined as
[?]
PA = (
υ
2
+
i
2
) |HH〉 〈HH |+ υ |HD〉 〈HD|+ (υ
2
+ d) |DD〉 〈DD| , (12)
PB = (
υ
2
+
i
2
) |HH〉 〈HH |+ υ |DH〉 〈DH |+ (υ
2
+ d) |DD〉 〈DD| . (13)
The payoff functions for Alice and Bob are the mean values of the above oper-
ators, i.e.,
$A(p, q) = Tr(PAρf ),
$B(p, q) = Tr(PBρf ). (14)
5
The expected payoff functions for both the players are obtained using Eqs.
(11,14)
$A(p, q) = (
υ
2
+
i
2
)[pq |a|2 + p(1− q) |c|2 + q(1− p) |d|2 + (1− p)(1 − q) |b|2]
+υ[pq |c|2 + p(1− q) |a|2 + q(1− p) |b|2 + (1− p)(1− q) |d|2]
+(
υ
2
+ d)[pq |b|2 + p(1− q) |d|2 + q(1 − p) |c|2 + (1 − p)(1− q) |a|2 ,
$B(p, q) = (
υ
2
+
i
2
)[pq |a|2 + p(1− q) |c|2 + q(1− p) |d|2 + (1− p)(1 − q) |b|2]
+υ
[
pq |d|2 + p(1− q) |b|2 + q(1− p) |a|2 + (1− p)(1 − q) |c|2
]
+(
υ
2
+ d)[pq |b|2 + p(1− q) |d|2 + q(1 − p) |c|2 + (1 − p)(1− q) |a|2].
(15)
Corresponding to the set of values we considered earlier, i.e., Eq. (6), the above
set of payoff functions becomes:
$A(p, q) = p[q{−60 |a|2 − 60 |b|2 + 60 |c|2 + 60 |d|2}
−25 |c|2 + 25 |b|2 + 35 |a|2 − 35 |d|2]
+q[75 |b|2 − 75 |d|2 − 15 |a|2 + 15 |c|2]
−25 |b|2 + 50 |d|2 + 15 |a|2 ,
$B(p, q) = q[p{−60 |a|2 − 60 |b|2 + 60 |c|2 + 60 |d|2}
−25 |d|2 + 25 |b|2 + 35 |a|2 − 35 |c|2]
+p[75 |b|2 − 75 |c|2 + 15 |d|2 − 15 |a|2]
−25 |b|2 + 50 |c|2 + 15 |a|2 . (16)
As the classical version of the Hawk and Dove game is symmetric, one would
expect in the quantum version of the game interchanging p and q would change
$A(p, q) into $B(p, q). However, it is interesting to note that in quantum version
of the game would be symmetric, if c = d in initial quantum state |ψin〉 (9).
This observation is consistent with earlier work on ESS where quantum version
of the game is shown to be symmetric [9, 10, 11]. In our case, the possibility of
asymmetric game is due to the choice of general initial quantum state instead
of one of the Bell states. Next we discuss both symmetric and asymmetric case
in our game separately.
4.1 Symmetric case
Our generalized treatment of Hawk and Dove game become symmetric for game
for c = d in initial state. The corresponding payoff functions, i.e., Eq. (16),
become:
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$A(p, q) = p[q{−60 |a|2 − 60 |b|2 + 120 |c|2}+ 35 |a|2 + 25 |b|2 − 60 |c|2]
+q[−15 |a|2 + 75 |b|2 − 60 |c|2] + 15 |a|2 − 25 |b|2 + 50 |c|2 ,
$B(p, q) = q[p{−60 |a|2 − 60 |b|2 + 120 |c|2}+ 35 |a|2 + 25 |b|2 − 60 |c|2]
+p[−15 |a|2 + 75 |b|2 − 60 |c|2] + 15 |a|2 − 25 |b|2 + 50 |c|2 . (17)
Being a symmetric game the players are anonymous, therefore the subscripts A
and B are not necessary, i.e., $A(p, q) = $B(p, q) = $(p, q). Corresponding NE
inequality becomes
$(p∗, q∗)− $(p, q∗) ≥ 0
This condition in our example translates to:
(p∗ − p)[q∗{−60 |a|2 − 60 |b|2 + 120 |c|2}+ 35 |a|2 + 25 |b|2 − 60 |c|2] ≥ 0 (18)
Upon inspection it can be seen that the above inequality holds if both the factors
have same sign. Lets consider following three cases:
4.1.1 Case 1:
Lets consider a case of a pure strategy (p∗ = 0, q∗ = 0) and examine the possi-
bility of it being a NE. The inequality (18) for this strategy requires 35 |a|2 +
25 |b|2− 60 |c|2 < 0. This holds, for example, when |a|2 = 1
16
, |b|2 = 1
4
, |c|2 = 11
32
.
The corresponding payoff functions from Eqs. (17) are
$(0, 0) =
95
8
,
$(p, 0) =
95
8
− 195
16
p. (19)
Which means $(0, 0) > $(p, 0) ∀ 0 < p < 1, therefore, the strategy (p∗ = 0, q∗ = 0)
is an ESS. In the context of our evolutionary game if both the players are
playing strategy C no mutant strategy can invade for an initial state, |ψin〉 =
1
4
|HH〉+ 1
2
|DD〉+
√
11
32
|HD〉+
√
11
32
|DH〉 . Therefore, in contrast to the classi-
cal version of the game pure strategies can also be a ESS in the quantum version
of the game under certain conditions.
4.1.2 Case 2:
Lets examine another case of pure strategy (p∗ = 1, q∗ = 1) to be a NE. For this
strategy the inequality given by Eq. (18) demands −25 |a|2−35 |b|2+60 |c|2 > 0.
This holds, for example, for |a|2 = 1
16
, |b|2 = 1
8
, |c|2 = 13
32
. The corresponding
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payoff functions from Eqs. (17) are
$(1, 1) =
165
8
$(p, 1) =
35
16
+
295
16
p. (20)
Since $(1, 1)−$(p, 1) = 295
16
(1−p) > 0 ∀ 0 < p < 1, therefore, (p∗ = 1, q∗ = 1) is
an ESS. Thus a population engaged in the pure strategy(p∗ = 1, q∗ = 1) cannot
be invaded by any mutant strategy if for the initial quantum state the inequality
−25 |a|2−35 |b|2+60 |c|2 > 0 holds, which correspond to the initial state |ψin〉 =
1
4
|HH〉+
√
1
8
|DD〉+
√
13
32
|HD〉+
√
13
32
|DH〉.
4.1.3 Case 3:
Lets explore the possibility of mixed NE in the quantum version of the game
when the players apply their operators with probability 0 < p < 1. From the
inequality given by Eq. (18), the mixed NE is
p∗ = q∗ =
−7 |a|2 − 5 |b|2 + 12 |c|2
12(− |a|2 − |b|2 + 2 |c|2) . (21)
Corresponding to the classical version of the game, we get
(
p∗ = 7
12
, q∗ = 7
12
)
.
In quantum version of the game we can obtain this value, for example, for
|a|2 = 1
2
, |b|2 = |c|2 = 1
6
. The initial state, then, takes the form
|ψin〉 =
1√
2
|HH〉+ 1√
6
|DD〉+ 1√
6
|HD〉+ 1√
6
|DH〉 (22)
Now from Eq. (17)
$(p∗, q∗) = $(p, q∗) = 8.75,
$(q, q) =
−60q2 + 20q + 35
3
,
$(p∗, q) =
−600q + 665
36
.
It can be seen that $(p∗, q) − $(q, q) > 0, ∀ 0 < q < 1. This implies that
$(p∗, q) > $(q, q). Therefore (p∗, q∗) given by Eq. (21) is a mixed ESS for the
above initial quantum state.
4.2 Asymmetric case
Our initial quantum state correspond to asymmetric game for c 6= d for which
an ESS is defined with strict Nash inequality [6]. In this case a strategy
pair (A∗, B∗) is an ESS if NE conditions with strict inequalities hold, i.e.,
$A(A
∗, B∗) > $A(A,B
∗) for all A 6= A∗ and $B(A∗, B∗) > $B(A∗, B) for all
B 6= B∗. Nash inequalities (16) then yield
8
$A(p
∗, q∗)− $A(p, q∗) ≥ 0
⇒ (p∗ − p)[60q∗{− |a|2 − |b|2 + |c|2 + |d|2}+ 35 |a|2 + 25 |b|2 − 25 |c|2 − 35 |d|2] ≥ 0
(23)
and
$B(p
∗, q∗)− $A(p∗, q) ≥ 0
⇒ (q∗ − q)[60p∗{− |a|2 − |b|2 + |c|2 + |d|2}+ 35 |a|2 + 25 |b|2 − 35 |c|2 − 25 |d|2] ≥ 0
(24)
From these inequalities three Nash equilibria arise
4.2.1 Case 1:
From inequalities (23), (24) with (p∗ = 0, q∗ = 0) , we get
35 |a|2 + 25 |b|2 − 25 |c|2 − 35 |d|2 < 0 (25)
35 |a|2 + 25 |b|2 − 35 |c|2 − 25 |d|2 < 0 (26)
respectively. Both these inequalities (25) and (26) are satisfied, for example, for
|a|2 = 1
16
, |b|2 = 1
4
, |c|2 = 9
16
, |d|2 = 1
8
. Therefore, from Eq. (16)
$A(0, 0) =
15
16
$A(p, 0) =
15
16
− 10p (27)
$B(0, 0) =
365
16
$B(0, q) =
365
16
− 230
16
q (28)
Since $A(0, 0) > $A(p, 0) ∀ 0 < p < 1 and $B(0, 0) > $B(0, q) ∀ 0 < q < 1.
Therefore, strict inequality holds and strategy (p∗ = 0, q∗ = 0) is an ESS.
4.2.2 Case 2:
Similarly from inequalities (23), (24) with (p∗ = 1, q∗ = 1) , we get
− 25 |a|2 − 35 |b|2 + 35 |c|2 + 25 |d|2 > 0 (29)
−25 |a|2 − 35 |b|2 + 25 |c|2 + 35 |d|2 > 0 (30)
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respectively. These inequalities are satisfied, for example, for |a|2 = 1
16
, |b|2 = 1
8
,
|c|2 = 9
16
, |d|2 = 1
4
. Hence from eq. (16)
$A(1, 1) =
455
16
$A(p, 1) =
135
16
+ 20p (31)
$B(1, 1) =
205
16
$B(1, q) =
270
16
q − 65
16
(32)
Again it shows that $A(1, 1) > $A(p, 1) ∀ 0 < p < 1 and $B(1, 1) > $B(1, q) ∀
0 < q < 1. As strict inequality holds in this case, therefore,(p∗ = q∗ = 1) is an
ESS.
4.2.3 Case 3:
For asymmetric case from inequalities (23), (24), we get
p∗ =
−7 |a|2 − 5 |b|2 + 7 |c|2 + 5 |d|2
12(− |a|2 − |b|2 + |c|2 + |d|2) , (33)
q∗ =
−7 |a|2 − 5 |b|2 + 5 |c|2 + 7 |d|2
12(− |a|2 − |b|2 + |c|2 + |d|2) . (34)
Strict inequality does not hold for these values, therefore, it is not an ESS.
5 Summary
Evolutionary game theory with ESS as central idea is an interesting branch of
game theory. It was developed by mathematical biologists to model evolution-
ary dynamics. Introduction of quantum mechanics in evolutionary game theory
transpired very interesting situations, e.g., in a quantum version of Rock Scis-
sor Paper (RSP) mixed NE becomes stable contrary to classical version of the
game where no stable mixed NE exit [9]. Similarly quantization of the Prisoner
Dilemma and the Battle of Sexes showed that evolutionary stability of NE in
symmetric as well in asymmetric games can be changed by maneuvering initial
quantum state [10, 11].
We quantized the Hawk-Dove game using a pure initial quantum state of
two-qubit system in its most general form. We showed that for quantization of
this symmetric classical game, initial quantum state plays a crucial role in keep-
ing it symmetric or asymmetric. In other words there is a restriction on initial
quantum state for which a classical game remains symmetric in its quantum
form. To elaborate our point we considered an example with set of parameters
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for which there is no pure ESS for the classical Hawk-Dove game though there
exits mixed ESS. However in quantum version of the game, even a pure strategy
can be an ESS for certain initial quantum state. We analyzed both symmetric
and asymmetric situations and showed that pure ESS can exist in both sym-
metric and asymmetric whereas mixed ESS exists only in the symmetric form
of the quantum version of the game.
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